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ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS OF FACT
14.

During jury selection, Appellant challenged Juror No. 2,

Sue Sanft, for cause. This juror was seated and served as foreperson. [It is
uncontested that Harding challenged Mrs. Sanft for cause during voir dire in
chambers because of very strong biases expressed in the Questionnaire and an
oral voir dire. Immediately upon discovering that this challenge for cause was
not included in the original record prepared for appeal, Appellant moved to
supplement the record. The official transcript memorializing Appellant's
challenge to Mrs. Sanft for cause has been prepared and either filed with this
Court or awaits filing in the Fourth District Court. Though Harding holds an
original copy of this transcript, she felt uncomfortable attaching it until it was
officially included.]
15.

At trial, Dr. Bell openly argued that evidence of Appellant's

conduct prior to consulting Dr. Bell should be considered as comparative
negligence on her part. R. 1412:15.
//
//
//
//
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ARGUMENT
REPLY POINT I
- Significant Prejudice APPELLANT SUFFERED MATERIAL PREJUDICE AT
TRIAL AS A RESULT OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
ERRONEOUS DENIALS OF HER CHALLENGES FOR
CAUSE.
A. Introduction.
When contesting ajury verdict for improprieties injury selection,
a party must show that the trial court committed legal error by failing to
dismiss a juror for cause and that the failure to strike prejudiced the losing
party. State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994). This Court should
review the trial court's decision not to strike the three potential jurors for cause
under an abuse of discretion standard. See Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533,
536 (Utah 1981). However, the Court should review the decision, "in light of
the fact that it is a simple matter to obviate any problem of bias simply by
excusing the prospective juror and selecting another." Id.
Prejudice may be shown by demonstrating multiple, cumulative
errors in for-cause challenges:
To that end, we will take into account on a cumulative basis all
erroneous rulings with respect to rulings on voir dire and for-
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cause challenges ku uie purposes of de termii ling vv 1 letl lei thei eis
reversible error.

added). Preji idice may a Iso be demonstrated by showing that, as a result of the
erroneous failure to excuse on a for-cause challenge, a biased juror sat. State
v. Wach 2001 UT 35 \ 40, 24 l\3d 948 at 957 (2001) ~" is may be shown by
proving that a juror who actually sat had been challenged for cause. Id. at ^f 36.
B. The Wach Standard,
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The trial court asked whether that experience would affect her ability to be fair
and impartial and the juror's response was that it would not. Id.
Juror No. 21 in Wach, when questioned about whether she had any
experience in observing a criminal offense, answered that she worked at a
hospital and then stated, "Well, I guess I am biased." Id. at % 17. The trial
court attempted to rehabilitate the witness by asking her if she thought she
could set her bias aside and the juror failed to respond. The court then briefly
explained the presumption of innocence and the requirement of a unanimous
verdict and then again asked the juror if she could set her perceived bias aside,
to which she responded that she thought she could. Id. The trial court denied
the defendant's challenges for cause as to both Juror Nos. 3 and 21. Id. at \ 18.
Wach then used two of his four peremptory challenges to remove these jurors.
Significantly, however, Wach did not seek additional voir dire of either juror,
nor did he challenge for cause or indicate any displeasure with the other
members of the jury as seated. Id. at ^ 17-18. In these respects, Wach is
considerably different than the case sub judice, where additional voir dire
exposed the bias yet further, and a sitting juror was challenged for cause.
On appeal, Wach alleged that the failure of the trial court to strike
the two jurors for cause forced him to use two of his peremptory challenges to
strike jurors who should have been stricken for cause. The Supreme Court
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found that vv hile the ti ial cot lr tdid not abuse i ts disci e tion in • : • * errulh ig the

s'-u
been the victim of an assault, the circumstances surrounding the crimes were
quite different, and the juror' s assurance of impartiality completely rebutted the
initial indication of possible bias. However, the Court did find an abuse of
discretion for the trial court's decision not to strike Turor \To 2 1

T

--~x—e

Russon keyed in on a vital excerpt of dialoguefromthe \ wii dire proceedings.
The trial c^;iaSKea the prospective miors

i.au .J.} w.-4*:i u i ^

• -ise.

F [Juror No. 21]:
The Court
[Juror No. 21]:
The Court:
[Juror No. 21]:
The Court:

1... have worked in hospitals for twenty years
andUh-huh.
And I feel pretty strongly about that and 7
don't - well, / guess I am biased
I can appreciate that. Can you set it aside?
(No response )
If you're selected as a juror, can you listen to
the evidence? Again,, you know, nobody is
guilty of anything at this stage. We have a
great Constitution that says we all have a
presumption of innocence until proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt and that is where
we ask eight jurors to listen to the evidence
and, based upon the evidence, reach whatever
conclusion they deem appropriate. It has to

[Juror No. 21 ]:
The Court:
[Juror No. 21]:

be unanimous. And that will be discussed
more as this case goes on. Can you or can
you not?
I believe I could.
You think you could?
Yes.

The Court:

Okay.

Id. Thus, Juror No. 21 in Wach explicitly declared a bias, in very similar
language to Jurors 11 and 7 in Harding. Juror No. 21 was "rehabilitated" by
the court, in essence telling the juror how important it was to be fair ("we have
a great Constitution . . . presumption of innocence . . .," etc.), which is very
comparable to the trial court's "rehabilitation" in Harding. The juror had life
experiences in a hospital with those injured by criminal activity and thought
she was biased. The Supreme Court found that the juror made statements that
"facially raise a question of partiality or prejudice, [and] an abuse of discretion
occurs unless the challenged juror is removed by the court or unless the court
or counsel investigates further and finds the inference rebutted." Id. at \ 27,
954 (internal quotes omitted). Rebuttal is accomplished by a showing that the
juror's statement was "merely the product of a light impression and not one
that would close the mind against the testimony that may be offered in
opposition." Id. (quotations omitted).
With regard to Juror No. 21, the court found that "[a]statement
made by a juror that she intends to be fair and impartial loses much of its
-6-

meaning in light of other testimony and facts which suggest a bias. " Id. at
Tf 34, 955 (emphasis added). Even though the trial court twice asked the
prospective juror whether she could objectively view the evidence, her faint
assurance that she could, when viewed in light of her previous statement of
bias did not give the trial court sufficient evidence to deny the challenge for
cause. Id. Justice Russon noted:
[Ajlthough juror No. 21 stated that she "believed" she could
remain fair and impartial, her statement does not alter the fact that
she indicated that as a result of her experience working at a
hospital she had witnessed numerous instances of criminal
behavior and was therefore "biased."
Id. From this precedent, it is clear that a trial court's voir dire must go beyond
simply asking a juror if she can set aside her stated bias and view the evidence
objectively. The court must have sufficient evidence for its independent
finding that the prospective juror can be impartial.
C. Challenges for Cause - Admissions of Bias by
Social and Family Ties to the Defense,
In the case at hand, three prospective jurors were biased because
of family and social ties directly to the defendant. The quality and impact of
this "personal favoritism" type bias is potentially far more prejudicial to the
concept of a fair trial than general life experiences by the two challenged jurors
in Wach. Two of these Harding jurors, Nos. 11 and 7, openly admitted that
-7-

they were biased. No. 11, Mrs. Todd, would maybe "tend to favor [the chief
defense liability expert's] testimony" as opposed to someone who had a
different view because the defense expert was her second cousin, and she was
very close to the doctor's mother, her first cousin. See Fact 2, Appellant's
Brief at 5-6. Juror No. 7, Mrs. Vance, had numerous close social and school
associations with Dr. Bell's wife and daughter because the juror's daughter
was in the same elementary school class with Dr. Bell's daughter. Mrs. Vance
associated with Dr. Bell's wife in the PTA, and had even been on a schoolsponsored overnight activity with Dr. Bell's wife and their respective
daughters. Further, if she were called to serve, "I may feel inhibited around his
family in the future." R. 1411:8-:3-12. She twice stated that she might tend
to "favor his testimony" and could not "guarantee" that she could be fair,
before she was "rehabilitated."

Fact 3, Appellant's Brief at 7-8;

R. 1410:20:20-24. This type of personal association and bias is definitely the
product of more than a "light impression." It would surely tend to "close the
mind" of the juror to the other side. There was no need to pick this juror.
Juror No. 11, a second cousin of the principal defense expert
witness, Dr. Kim Bateman, repeatedly admitted bias, yet the trial court failed
to resolve the issue. Mrs. Todd was "very close" and first cousin to the
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witness's mother (R. 1410:16:19-21; 20:9); had heard other people including
the mother make favorable comments about the witness (R. 1410:20:10-12);
and had "a very high opinion of him." R. 1410:20:13-17. Given these
circumstances, even an express acknowledgment by Juror No. 11 that she
could be impartial should have been rejected by the trial court. The trial court
did not successfully rebut the presumption of bias that such an admission
raises. Indeed, given these facts any statement by Juror No. 11 that she could
view the evidence impartially meant very little. In light of the fact that another
juror could easily have been substituted, the trial court abused its discretion by
denying plaintiffs challenge for cause.
Juror No. 12 (Marilyn Wursten) admitted that her best friend was
a current patient of Dr. Bell's. R. 1411:29:14-15; R. 1423. This social
relationship clearly demonstrated her bias as well. She also admitted receiving
favorable information about Dr. Bell through her friend. Fact 4, Appellant's
Brief. This social tie to the defendant shows an ongoing risk that Ms. Wursten
could not be impartial despite her claim to the contrary. Clearly, information
she received from a trusted friend made her predisposed to favor the defendant
and give more credibility to his testimony.
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The indicia of bias in Harding are far stronger than those shown
by the jurors in Wach because personal, family, or social ties are inherent
characteristics which have a fundamental impact on how jurors view facts and
assess credibility. The Wach jurors were only challenged because they had life
experiences that may indicate bias. Obviously, a juror who is directly related
to a key defense witness and who is close to the witness's mother has a far
greater potential for bias favoring the credibility of that witness than a juror
who has only witnessed medical consequences of a crime similar to the one
charged. Close family, social, and personal ties are seldom, if ever, "merely
the product of a light impression and not one that would close the mind against
the testimony that may be offered in opposition." Wach, 2001 UT 35 at ^ 27,
24 P.3d at 954 (citations and quotations omitted). Family and friendship must
truly be two of the strongest associations known to man. The inference of bias
was never rebutted and it was error to not excuse all three for cause.
D. Material Prejudice Shown,
Being forced to use her three peremptory challenges on jurors
with close family and social ties to the defense was prejudicial for two reasons:
a) the cumulative effect of the errors; and b) biased jurors ultimately sat, one
of whom was challenged for cause. Under the Wach standard, the complaining
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party must show that it challenged a juror who actually sat to prove that there
was prejudice. Wach, 2001 UT 35 at \ 36. As a result of the failure to dismiss
Juror Nos. 7,11, and 12 (see Harding's Brief at 8), Appellant was forced to use
her peremptory challenges to dismiss these jurors. This resulted in Juror Nos.
1 and 2 sitting, one of whom was challenged for cause (No. 2), with the other
(No. 1) strongly opposed by the Appellant.
Appellant challenged Juror No. 2 (Mrs. Sanft) for cause, alleging
strong biases. Fact 14. The challenge was denied and since Plaintiff had used
all three of her peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors with
family, social, or personal ties to the defendant, she was unable to remove Mrs.
Sanft. R. 1192, 1207-6. As a result, Mrs. Sanft sat on the jury and, in fact,
served as foreperson. R. 1207-4. This indicated that not only did Mrs. Sanft
have the immediate influence of her one vote, but that she was looked on as a
leader among the jurors and likely influenced the views of others. Plaintiff
challenged Mrs. Sanft for cause because of her apparent bias, disfavoring
awarding damages in personal injury suits. See Appellant's Brief at 26. This
was the actual prejudice suffered by Harding.
Dr. Bell rejects the idea that Harding may also demonstrate
prejudice by showing the cumulative effect of the court's improper denial of
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three for-cause challenges, implying that Saunders has been overruled or
modified by Wach. Such is not the case. Saunders, a 1999 case, stands
squarely for the proposition that prejudice may be shown by the "cumulative
effect" of multiple erroneous for-cause rulings. The case was cited with
approval in Wach at ^f 37, fn. 4. Apparently, the only reason it was not applied
in Wach was that there was only one for-cause error. Wach, f 37 ("Therefore,
because this case involves only one erroneous for-cause ruling, Wach's
cumulative error argument fails").
The jury panel in Harding was heavily skewed ideologically
toward the defendant and plaintiff had no real ability to influence or balance
its composition.
REPLY POINT II
- Appellant Appropriately Marshaled the Evidence —
APPELLANT HAS SUCCESSFULLY MARSHALED THE
EVIDENCE SHOWING INSUFFICIENCY OF THE
EVIDENCE OF HER COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
The evidence was insufficient to support the jury's verdict,
considered without the irrelevant facts occurring before Jeri' s first appointment
with Dr. Bell on January 13,1997. Dr. Bell makes a bevy of inaccurate claims
regarding Appellant's insufficiency argument, where are addressed here.
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A. Appellant Has Successfully Marshaled the Evidence.
Dr. Bell criticizes Harding because she "fails to cite to the
testimony of either of defendant's experts," and "did not even request
transcription of the trial testimony of Dr. Ganellen, one of Dr. Bell's expert
witnesses on the issues of negligence and causation." Bell's Brief at 16.
Furthermore, Dr. Bell alleges that the testimony of plaintiff s expert witnesses,
Drs. Icenogle and Rosenthal, was favorable "for the defense on crossexamination," and also should have been marshaled on appeal. Id Dr. Bell
misunderstands the requirement of marshaling evidence on appeal.
The requirement of marshaling evidence on appeal is simply to
collect the evidence "in support of the [challenged] verdict" and then
demonstrate that it is insufficient when viewed in a light most favorable to the
verdict. State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30 \ 2, 25 P. 3d 985 (Utah 2001). The
obligation is not to marshal evidence supporting a portion of the verdict
favorable to the appellant, which obviously is not appealed. Nor is the
obligation to marshal evidence favoring positions advocated by the appellee,
but which are not relevant to the portion of the judgment appealed by Harding.
In this case, both parties received, in part, a favorable verdict from
the jury. Mrs. Harding obtained a jury verdict to the effect that Dr. Bell was
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45% at fault, and that his negligence was a proximate cause of her injuries. R.
1049-51. That means that the jury believed Harding's evidence that Dr. Bell
failed to meet the standard of care in treating a person with Ms. Harding's
presenting symptoms. Appellant has no quarrel with this finding and is not
appealing it. Therefore, she has no obligation to marshal evidence supporting
this finding. Yet, Dr. Bell criticizes Ms. Harding for failure to marshal
evidence "on the issues of negligence and causation." Yet, these are not issues
in the case on appeal.
Dr. Bell is understandably upset that he was also found negligent,
but he did not appeal the sufficiency of the evidence on this issue. Had Dr.
Bell appealed this issue, it would begin his obligation to marshal the evidence
in favor of a finding of negligence and causation against him, and then
demonstrate that it was insufficient to show negligence and causation of Ms.
Harding's heart attack. However, Dr. Bell has failed to appeal this issue and
thus waived it. It is an irrelevant issue for Harding on appeal, where her claim
is that there was insufficient evidence of her negligence, such that there was
no basis at law to compare her non-negligent actions to the negligence of Dr.
Bell, who was found by the jury to be negligent. Accordingly, there is no need
to examine the transcript of testimony of Dr. Ganellen. His testimony dealt
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only with causation, but even if it had addressed negligence, it was obviously
rejected by the jury because Dr. Bell was found negligent and a proximate
cause. Harding has no obligation to marshal evidence of Dr. Bell's negligence
because she is not appealing that favorable finding.
Likewise, even if Harding's witnesses, Drs. Icenogle and
Rosenthal, allegedly testified "favorably for the defense" on crossexamination,1 as claimed by Dr. Bell, it would be irrelevant to this appeal.
Such testimony would only go to the negligence and causation of Dr. Bell,
which are not at issue here for the reasons set forth above. It is not incumbent
on Appellant to exonerate Dr. Bell, as he claims. Bell's Brief at 17.
B. Prior Evidence Improperly Considered in Determining
Comparative Negligence,
Appellant is only contesting the consideration of the evidence
prior to January 13th in determining her comparative negligence.

[Other

evidence of lack of comparative negligence after 1/13/97 was addressed
adequately in Appellant's main Brief] Dr. Bell's contention that evidence of
Jeri's condition prior to January 13th should be considered for comparative
negligence is a tautological nightmare designed to obfuscate valid legal
precedent. Dr. Bell argues Harding's claim here is really a challenge to the
1

They didn't so testify.
-15-

trial court's ruling on admissibility of Jeri's prior history, which objection was
"waived." Bell's Brief at 19. Not so.
Harding is challenging the use of the "prior health history" for the
determination of comparative negligence on her part. Dr. ESell's contention
that Harding contests its "admission" is a gross mischaracterization of her
argument. Bell's Brief at 19. Dr. Bell argues:
According to Harding, her conduct prior to January 13, 1997,
could not be a contributing factor in causing her injury and thus
this evidence should not have been admitted and considered by
the jury and, without this evidence, the jury could not have found
any comparative negligence by Harding. Substantively, this is a
challenge to the jury verdict based on the admission of evidence
for consideration by the jury, not for insufficiency of the
evidence.
Bell's Brief at 19. Dr. Bell contends that because Harding did not object to
"admission" of the evidence that the issue was improperly preserved. Id. at 20.
Appellant is not complaining about admission of the evidence.

To the

contrary, Harding's medical history, including the occurrence on at the truck
stop and her smoking, go directly to prove notice and thus negligence on the
part of Dr. Bell for failing to assess her risk factors for heart attack and to
diagnose and treat her unstable angina. Put in this context, the fact that
Appellant herself introduced evidence of her smoking is of little significance.
Bell's Brief at 19. Harding only contests the consideration of the evidence
-16-

of prior health problems by the jury in determining her alleged comparative
negligence. Harding's Brief at 33-38.
This Court has solidly held that a professional may not invoke
comparative negligence based on facts occurring before the professional was
consulted. See Steiner Corp, v. Johnson & Higgins, 996 P.2d 531 (Utah 2000).
Harding has already thoroughly addressed this issue in her main brief.
Appellant's Brief at 33-35. To allow Dr. Bell to use pre-visit evidence to show
comparative fault would allow doctors to make an end run around virtually all
claims of malpractice by claiming that something the patient did before
consulting them was a greater cause of the harm. Of course, the result is
absurd and cannot be allowed. It was unlawful for the jury to consider any
facts regarding Harding's comparative negligence that occurred before January
13, 1997. Accordingly, there is no evidence to support the jury's finding of
55% comparative negligence on Jeri' s part. The trial court should have granted
Harding's motion for a directed verdict as to her lack of negligence.
C. Dr. Bell Openly Argued That Prior Evidence
Demonstrated Appellant's Negligence,
Dr. Bell asserts that "evidence of Harding's smoking and other
risk factors predating January 13,1997, was not introduced for the purpose of
establishing comparative fault: This evidence was presented for the purpose
-17-

of establishing damages and relevant medical issues." Bell's Brief at 20. This
is disingenuous since Dr. Bell argued exactly the opposite at trial. For
example, Dr. Bell argued that the pre-January 13th evidence, like the truck stop
incident, clearly demonstrated Ms. Harding's comparative negligence:
I think most people would agree, given the symptoms she
described at the truck stop, that a reasonable person would go
see the doctor that day; at a minimum you would go to an
Instacare, an emergency room or go see your own doctor. Dr.
Bell's number is listed in the phone book, his home number. But
instead she doesn't do that. She goes up to Morgan and just
completely decides she is not going to do anything on the 4th.
Now the testimony is undisputed that after the 4th she continued
to do all of her chores and had no chest pain.
R. 1412:15:6-15 (Defense Closing Argument). Thus, Dr. Bell clearly intended
that this pre-visit evidence be considered by the jury for comparative
negligence.
CONCLUSION
Harding was denied a fair trial because the trial court improperly
refused to excuse three jurors that were challenged for cause. The focus of the
for-cause challenges was personal bias in favor of Dr. Bell (and his only
liability expert). This type of bias (family and friendship) is fair more ominous
and less likely to be "rehabilitated" than the general life experience bias in
Wach. Furthermore, the cumulative effect of three failures to excuse jurors
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who should have been excused for cause was extremely prejudicial and
devastating to Harding's case and denied her a fair trial.
In order to prove insufficiency of the evidence in this case,
Harding was required only to marshal and show the insufficiency of the
evidence supporting the 55% liability verdict in favor of Dr. Bell. Harding is
not required to marshal evidence opposing the 45% favorable verdict
demonstrating Dr. Bell's negligence. Dr. Bell could have appealed the jury's
verdict wherein he was found 45% at fault and a proximate cause of the
damage, but he chose not to lodge such an appeal and therefore has waived any
objection thereto. Had he lodged such an appeal, it would have been his
burden to marshal the evidence supporting the 45% finding for Harding and
show that it was insufficient to support that verdict.
Additionally, it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to
consider facts occurring prior to the visit to Dr. Bell for the purpose of
comparative fault. The court should have granted Harding's motion for a
directed verdict on this issue because there was no evidence that Harding was
negligent.
DATED this 19th day of D u m b e r , 2001.

ROBERT B. SYKESjA^brney fbf Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of Appellant's Reply
Brief were served upon all parties of record, at the address listed below, by
hand-delivery on this 19th day of December, 2001:
Gary B. Ferguson, Esq.
Dennis C. Ferguson, Esq.
WILLIAMS & HUNT
257 East 200 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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